

# PLIR 7000

## Core Seminar in International Relations

### Fall 2016

Wed. 1-3:30 p.m.  
Nau Hall 141

John Owen  
Gibson S-465, (92)4-3523  
[jmo4n@virginia.edu](mailto:jmo4n@virginia.edu)

Phil Potter  
Gibson S-466  
[phil@virginia.edu](mailto:phil@virginia.edu)

This course, restricted to graduate students, surveys the main schools, theorists, and problems in the North American study of international relations (IR). It is designed to develop students' ability to understand, and assess critically, analyses of international relations. It is intended as an important step in preparing for Ph.D. comprehensive examinations in IR. It is also designed to provoke thinking about thesis and dissertation topics. It is less a course about international relations than about how political scientists study international relations; hence it is part of graduate students' initiation into the scholarly guild.

Students lacking any background in IR theory may find the course difficult at first. The reading each week is extensive, the essays and discussions intensive; students must work together to cover it thoroughly.

Class sessions will consist of overviews and summaries by the instructors and concise presentations of the readings by students, but the bulk of our time will be taken up by discussion. The success of this seminar hinges on participation by all students. It is essential that everyone do the required readings by the start of class.

#### **Course Requirements:**

##### **1. Participation (25%)**

For each weekly meeting a set of required readings are assigned that range from 150 to 400 pages. Seminar members will be expected to have a firm grasp of required material and be ready to discuss it critically. This will necessarily involve active participation; failure to participate will be taken as a sign of inadequate preparation. If you are reluctant to speak in class, be aware that the profession requires its members to be able to engage in oral argumentation. In most courses of this type at UVa and elsewhere, students find it helpful to form study groups whose members divide up the readings and share notes among themselves. I encourage you to do this but will leave it to you to organize these groups and distribute notes. Class members will take turns acting as weekly scribe. The scribe of the week will not be required to participate in oral discussion.

##### **2. Short Essays (40%)**

Each student will write six short essays, each no longer than 400 words. *Each essay will formulate a researchable puzzle based upon some or all of the week's readings.* The puzzle may concern empirically testable propositions (e.g., how would we know if democracies never fight one another?), or theoretical claims (e.g., does it follow from standard realist assumptions that balances of power will always form?). Please submit these to the course's Collab site (under "Assignments") by 9:00

a.m. on the day of class. The deadlines and word limits will be strictly enforced. The instructors will assign each student three essays, and students may choose the other three. Students are free to trade weeks so long as they notify the instructors in advance. *Essays should not summarize the readings, except as necessary to frame the puzzle.*

### 3. Final Examination (35%)

The final exam will simulate the Ph.D. comprehensive examinations, except that it will comprise only two sections (theory and application) and take only three hours. It will be given early in the final exam period.

**N.B.:** *No grades of Incomplete will be given in this course.* Assignments must be handed in on time. Late papers will be marked down significantly. No written work will be accepted after the last day of final exams.

Most articles are available on the class Collab website. Please obtain the following books (old editions are fine):

Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

Kenneth A. Schultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

Readings from these books are marked by an asterisk (\*). All other course readings are available in digital form via the course website or from internet sources listed on the syllabus itself.

### WEEK 1 (August 24): The Presence of the Past

Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, I, 12-88; II, 34-65; III, 36-50. Available at <http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=njp.32101059041069;seq=11;view=1up;num=iii>

### WEEK 2 (August 31): Realism v. Idealism

Dante Alighieri, *On Monarchy* (1310?), Book I, <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2196/203185>

Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince* (1532), chapters III, XIII, <http://www.constitution.org/mac/prince00.htm>.

Immanuel Kant, "Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch" (1795), <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/kant1.htm>.

Richard Cobden, excerpts, in Arnold Wolfers & Laurence Martin, eds., *The Anglo-American Tradition in Foreign Affairs: Readings from Thomas More to Woodrow Wilson* (Yale UP, 1956), 192-205.

Hans J. Morgenthau & Kenneth W. Thompson, *Politics among Nations*, ch. 1.

Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State*, preface and ch. 2.

Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," *International Security* 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999), 42-63.

Jeffrey Legro & Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" *International Security* 24, no. 2 (Fall 1999), 5-55.

John M. Owen, "Liberal Approaches," typescript (July 2016).

**WEEK 3 (September 7): Levels of Analysis**

- J. David Singer, "The Levels of Analysis Problem in International Relations," *World Politics* 14, no. 1 (October 1961), 77-92.
- Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, ch. 6, "Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power."
- Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," *International Organization* 51 (October 1997), 513-53.
- Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988), 427-60.
- Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," *World Politics* 20, no. 3 (April 1968), 454-79.
- Jonathan Mercer, "Rationality and Psychology in International Politics," *International Organization* 59, no. 1 (Winter 2005), 77-106.
- David A. Lake & Robert Powell, "International Relations: A Strategic-Choice Approach," in idem, eds., *Strategic Choice and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 3-38.

**WEEK 4 (September 14): Order & Hierarchy**

- George Orwell, "Shooting an Elephant," <http://www.online-literature.com/orwell/887/>.
- Kenneth N. Waltz, "Anarchic Orders" (week 3), re-read.
- Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," *World Politics* 28 (1976), 317-47.
- Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), ch. 1.
- Duncan Snidal, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory," *International Organization* 39, no. 4 (1985), 579-614.
- David A. Lake, "Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations," *International Organization* 50, no. 1 (1996), 1-33.
- William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," *International Security* (Summer 1999), 5-41.
- Nuno Monteiro, "Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful," *International Security* 36, no. 3 (Winter 2011/12), 9-40.

**WEEK 5 (September 21): International Institutions**

- Robert O. Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," *International Organization* 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982), 325-55.
- John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95), 5-49.
- Robert O. Keohane & Lisa Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," *International Security* 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995), 39-51.
- G. John Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of the American Postwar Order," *International Security* 23, no. 3 (Winter 1998/99), 43-78.
- Alastair Iain Johnston, "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments," *International Studies Quarterly* 45, no. 4 (December 2001), 487-515.

Jana von Stein, "Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance," *American Political Science Review* 99, no. 4 (2005), 611-22.

Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Paul R. Hensel, "International Institutions and Compliance with Agreements," *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (2007), 721-37.

### **WEEK 6 (September 28): International Institutions and Domestic Politics**

Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements. *International Organization* 56:3 (2002): 477-513.

Lisa L. Martin, *Democratic Commitments*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Chapters 1 & 2.

Milner, Helen V. 1997. Interests, Institutions, and Information. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) chapters 1-4.

Beth A. Simmons. "International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs" *American Political Science Review* 94 (2000), 819-835.

Xinyuan Dai, "Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism," *International Organization* 59 (2005), 363-98.

### **WEEK 7 (October 5): Norms and Culture**

Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," *International Organization* 41, no. 3 (1987), 335-70.

Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It," *International Organization* 46 (1992), 391-425.

Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998), 887-917.

Jeffrey Legro, "The Transformation of Policy Ideas," *American Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 3 (July 2000), 419-43.

Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change," *International Organization* 55, no. 3 (2001), 553-88.

James D. Fearon & Alexander Wendt, "Rationalism *v.* Constructivism: A Skeptical View," in Walter Carlsnaes et al., eds., *Handbook of International Relations* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: SAGE, 2002), 52-72.

Nina Tannenwald. The nuclear taboo: The United States and the normative basis of nuclear non-use. *International Organization*, 53(3):433-468, 1999.

### **WEEK 8 (October 12): Strategic Interaction I: Conflict and Cooperation**

Robert Axelrod *The Evolution of Cooperation*, Basic Books 1984, chapters 1,2, 9..

Robert Powell. Absolute and Relative Gains In International Relations Theory. *American Political Science Review* (1991): 1303-1320.

Charles L. Glaser. Realists as optimists: Cooperation as self-help. *International Security*, 19(3):50-90, 1994.

James D. Fearon. Bargaining, enforcement, and international cooperation. *International Organization*, 52(2):269-305, 1998.

Andrew Kydd. Trust, reassurance and cooperation. *International Organization*, 54(2):325-357, 2000.

### **WEEK 9 (October 19): Strategic Interaction II: Signaling, Bargaining, and Information**

\* Schelling, chapters 1–4.

James D. Fearon. Rationalist explanations for war. *International Organization*, 49(3):379–414, 1995.

Erik Gartzke. “War is in the Error Term” *International Organization* 53 (1999): 567-587.

Robert Jervis. *The Logic of Images in International Relations*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1970. Chapter 4.

James D. Fearon. Signaling foreign policy interests: Tying hands versus sinking costs. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 41(1):68–90, 1997.

### **WEEK 10 (October 26): Democracies, Capitalism, Interdependence**

Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” *American Political Science Review* 80, no. 4 (December 1986), 1151-69.

John M. Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,” *International Security* 19, no. 4 (Fall 1994), 87-125.

Dan Reiter & Allen C. Stam III, “Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory,” *American Political Science Review* 92, no. 2 (June 1998), 377-89.

Michael Hiscox, Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility: Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade Legislation, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 96, No. 3 (September, 2002): 593-608.

Dale C. Copeland, “Economic Interdependence and War: A Trade Theory of Expectations,” *International Security* 20 (1996), 5-41.

Stephen G. Brooks, “The Globalization of Production and the Changing Benefits of Conquest,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43, no. 5 (1999), 646-70.

### **WEEK 11 (November 2): Domestic Politics and International Interactions**

\* Schultz, chapters 1, 2, 4, 5, and 8

Alexander B. Downes and Todd S. Sechser. The Illusion of Democratic Credibility. *International Organization* 66:3 (2012): 457–489.

Jessica L. Weeks. Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve. *International Organization* (2008): 35–64.

Philip B. K. and Matthew A. Baum. "Looking for audience costs in all the wrong places: Electoral institutions, media access, and democratic constraint." *The Journal of Politics* 76 (2014): 167-181.

William Bernhard and David Leblang. Democratic institutions and exchange rate commitments. *International Organization*, 53(1):71–97, 1999.

Jessica Chen Weiss. "Authoritarian signaling, mass audiences, and nationalist protest in China." *International Organization* 67.01 (2013): 1-35.

### **WEEK 12 (November 9): Leaders and Psychology**

Robert Jervis. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, chapter 6.

Daniel Kahneman and Jonathan Renshon. Why Hawks Win. *Foreign Policy* 154 (2007): 34–38.

Jonathan Mercer. Emotion and Strategy in the Korean War. *International Organization* 67:2 (2013): 1–31.

Marcus Holmes. The Force Of Face-To-Face Diplomacy: Mirror Neurons and The Problem Of Intentions. *International Organization* 67:4 (2013): 829-861.

Jack S. Levy. Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations. *International Studies Quarterly* 41:1 (1997): 87-112.

Stephen Peter Rosen. *War and Human Nature*. Princeton University Press (2009), chapter 4.

Horowitz, Michael C., and Allan C. Stam. "How prior military experience influences the future militarized behavior of leaders." *International Organization* 68.03 (2014): 527-559.

### **WEEK 13 (November 16): Inference, Evidence, and Experiments**

James D. Fearon, "Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science," *World Politics* 43:2 (1991), 169-195.

Barbara Geddes, "How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Research," in James Stimson (ed.), *Political Analysis*, vol. 2, 1990, 131-150.

John P. A. Ioannides, "Why Most Published Research Findings Are False," *PLOS Medicine*, August 30, 2005.

Dustin H. Tingley and Barbara F. Walter, "The Effect of Repeated Play on Reputation Building: An Experimental Approach," *International Organization* 65:2 (2011): 343-365.

Michael G. Findley, Daniel L. Nielson, and J.C. Sharman, "Using Field Experiments in International Relations: A Randomized Study of Anonymous Incorporation," *International Organization* 67:4 (2013): 657-693.

Susan Hyde, "The Observer Effect in International Politics: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," *World Politics* 60:1 (2007): 37-63.

Jason Lyall, Graeme Blair, and Kosuke Imai, "Explaining Support for Combatants during Wartime: A Survey Experiment in Afghanistan," *American Political Science Review* 107:4 (2013): 679-705.

### **November 23 – THANKSGIVING BREAK**

### **WEEK 14 (NOVEMBER 30): Getting Critical**

E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (New York: Palgrave, 2001 [originally published in 1939]), 62-83.

Stanley Hoffmann, "An American Social Science: International Relations," *Daedalus* 106 (1977), 41-60.

Tarak Barkawi & Mark Laffey, "The Imperial Peace: Democracy, Force and Globalization," *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 4 (1999), 403-34.

Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, "How Not To Be Lakatos Intolerant: Appraising Progress in International Relations Research," *International Studies Quarterly* 46, no. 2 (2002), 231-62.

J. Ann Tickner, "What Is Your Research Program? Some Feminist Answers to International Relations Methodological Questions," *International Studies Quarterly* (March 2005), 49(1).

David A. Lake, "Why 'Isms' Are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects as Impediments to Understanding and Progress," *International Studies Quarterly* 55 (2011), 465-80.

John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, "Leaving Theory Behind: Why Hypothesis Testing Has Become Bad for IR," *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 3 (2013), 427-57.